The Anthropocene, Resilience and Post-Colonial Computation by McQuillan, Daniel
The Anthropocene, Resilience and Post-Colonial Computation
Dr. Dan McQuillan 
Department of Computing, Goldsmiths, University of London, UK
Abstract
What forms of politics come with the contested ideas of the Anthropocene and resilience? Rather 
than taking these ideas as a given and looking at their political consequences, I will ask what 
politics enters at their points of construction, where they are understood as being constructed 
computationally. This allows me to read across from the Anthropocene and resilience to the other 
forms of computational anticipation that are becoming pervasive at the level of everyday life. As 
truth claims that depend on algorithms, I will argue that all of these constructions derive their 
authority from an entanglement of computation and science. Under current conditions, this 
entanglement brings it's own political tendencies, which can be characterised as colonial. To counter
this implicit colonialism I will draw on the feminist and post-colonial approaches of standpoint 
theory. I believe this offers an alternative to the current entanglements of anticipatory computation, 
and allows us to re-work it into a post-colonial politics of algorithms and atmospheres.
Computational Constructions, Anticipatory Interventions
The Anthropocene is geology's attempt to make a motivational statement about climate change. 
While outlining it's genealogy, my main purpose is not to deconstruct it as a concept but to trace its 
entanglement with computation. Geology has traditionally assigned meaningfully long periods of 
time through identifiable changes in the rock record. These epochs are of the order of millions of 
years long, and were an essential way to order the passage of time in the geological record before 
there was the possibility of radiometric dating. The idea that human geophysical influence is 
significant enough to warrant its own epoch has been gathering pace since the 1980s  (Edwards, 
2013), although critics argue that naming the Anthropocene is unnecessary because there are many 
other ways to measure human influence on the biosphere  (Scourse, 2016). They contend that the 
Anthropocene is a misappropriation of stratigraphic methods because affirming the importance of 
tackling climate change is not the role of the geological column (T. Brown, 2014). Nevertheless the 
idea now has scientific credibility and institutional backing, and a 2016 paper in Science determined
that the current era is both functionally and stratigraphically distinct from its predecessor, the 
Holocene (Waters et al., 2016). But whatever the motivation, you can't start a new geological layer 
without a clearly defined base layer. So stratigraphy still faces the question of how to identify the 
smoking gun of humankind's destructive influence; is it the transition from hunting to farming, the 
moment Columbus arrived in America, the industrial revolution, or perhaps atomic weapons testing 
in the 1960s? 
The Anthropocene Working Group is an officially constituted subcommission of the International 
Commission on Stratigraphy which has been working for some time on a sufficiently unique 
identifier. It recently published a paper in the journal Quaternary International proposing that the 
fingerprint of our collective alteration of the Earth as a geological as well as ecological system is 
the date of the Trinity nuclear test; the first atomic weapon explosion (Zalasiewicz et al., 2015). The
stratigraphic marker is the rise in radiation levels in the rock record due to the above-ground nuclear
tests of the 1950s and 1960s, when one bomb was detonated roughly every 10 days until the test 
ban treaty limited further atmospheric fallout. The majority of members on the panel therefore 
agreed that the date of the Trinity test, July 16th 1945, would be a "practical and effective" choice 
of base layer. But the wedding of the Anthropocene to the nuclear age in this way is a post-hoc step 
that somewhat obscures the fact that catastrophic man-made climate change only became thinkable 
in the first place through the entanglement of nuclear weapons and computation. 
Since the 1970s there had been recognition that aerosols posed a risk to climate stability that was 
opposite to the effects of carbon dioxide; a sufficiently increased concentration could cause a 
decrease in global average temperatures. In 1982, Paul Crutzen & John Birks published the book 
'The Atmosphere after a Nuclear War: Twilight at Noon' (Crutzen & Birks, 1982). They used two-
dimensional computer models, which were the apex of climate modelling at the time, to predict 
what later became known as Nuclear Winter; a global darkening and cooling due to the smoke and 
particulates generated by firestorms following a nuclear exchange. In the midst of the Cold War, the
prospect of a planet endarkened by nuclear conflict made human-induced damage to the atmosphere
seem like a real and immediate possibility, which paved the way for subsequent public alarm about 
climate change. After the end of the Cold War, national laboratories in the USA who had been 
equipped with supercomputers in order to to model nuclear weapon yields, and were facing a loss of
purpose, switched to climate modelling (Edwards, 2012). This made use of a lot of the same 
expertise in large data sets and atmospheric physics. In 2000 Paul Crutzen first used the term 
'Anthropocene' to describe the influence of human behaviour on the Earth's atmosphere, and 
became one of the concept's most influential popularisers and advocates (Crutzen & Stoermer., 
2000). The idea of the Anthropocene is built on a bedrock of supercomputing and climate change 
modelling. As we shall see, computing has also shaped the idea of resilience, a concept which has 
become increasingly important as a response to the climate crisis, amongst other things.
The idea of resilience comes from Holling's original 1973 paper on ecological systems (Holling, 
1973). He was looking at the balance of predator and prey, and replaced the simple idea of dynamic 
equilibrium with abstract concepts drawn from systems theory and cybernetics. His seminal insight 
was that the population of antelope drooping by 80% is not necessarily a sign of ecological disaster,
but an adaptive shift. Complex systems have multiple equilibriums, and movement between these is
not a collapse of the system but rather an adaptive cycle. The system persists, although in a changed
form. His approach was a watershed not just because of its embrace of complexity but because of its
abstraction; rather than a description of nature rich in naturalistic observation, his paper posits a 
hypothetical model of predator-prey relations characterised as "trajectories in the phase plane". This
was not only a mathematical but a fundamentally computational shift in understanding population 
dynamics. The field from which it sprang, systems ecology, had grown from ecologists engagement 
with the new ideas of cybernetics in the 1950's (Wiener, 1988) and systems analysis in the 1960s 
(Watt, 1962). Recognizing the complexity of ecological processes, the advocates of this approach 
wanted to strip away the simplifying assumptions of population ecologists, and were able to do so 
by embracing the mathematics and using computers to run simulations. Systems ecologists 
"need...training in mathematics and biomathematics but also FORTRAN and systems analysis" 
(Watt, 1966), where the FORTAN computing language was itself created by an IBM computer 
scientist who wanted to make it easier to compute nuclear missile trajectories (Bergstein, 2007). 
Going down the road of computational analysis changed Holling's own characterisation of 
resilience from something intuitive that might resonate with the emerging environmental movement
to something specifically systems oriented and computationally grounded.
Given that the message of resilience is 'the system persists, although in a changed form,' it is 
perhaps easy to see how it has become a governing idea in our current era of permanent multiple 
crises. As a form of governmentality it constitutes us as resilient populations and demands 
adaptation to emergencies of whatever kind, whether it's finance, environment or security. This idea 
of resilience is not the colloquial idea of an ineffable quality that enables some people to bounce 
back from stress and adversity, but a systems approach that has migrated sideways from the science 
of ecological systems. It is a holistic yet abstract view that sees society's mesh of population and 
infrastructures as a complex system with adaptive cycles. A system that is robust in the sense that 
radical changes are not necessarily catastrophic if they are movements between alternative 
equilibria and resilience is, in essence, this higher-level adaptation. Its 'good' is not measured in the 
cost of that adaptation but in the persistence of the system. In governmental practice, one of the 
main engines of resilience is the accelerated conversion of social systems to Hayek's self-organising
complexity of markets, with military intervention at the peripheries where this resisted (Dalby, 
2013). 
Such is the appeal of resilience in our securitised times that it became a mantra for the US 
Department for Homeland Security: “Ensuring Resilience to Disasters” was listed as a core 
Homeland Security Mission; and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan had the goal of 
“protection and resilience” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2010). The systems 
view of populations drawn from Holling's work has meshed with a systems view of infrastructures 
derived from the Cold War, where the emphasis was to understand how distributed infrastructures 
could survive nuclear attack; the same thinking which funded research in to packet-switched 
networks and hence the birth of the Internet (Galison, 2001)It has become a tool of strategic 
planning not only because of its narrative relevance but because the production of collateral data by 
so many other daily and commercial activities allows resilience to be modelled and predicted. 
Resilience's socio-technical utility can be seen in the way the Secretary of Homeland Security was 
able to apply it simultaneously to people and material systems when talking about her department's 
work to “strengthen the resilience of…infrastructure, computer networks, and of…communities and
citizens” (Napolitano, 2010). Computational methods such as Social Network Analysis are seen as 
predictors of community resilience to disasters (Magsino, 2009) and this modelling of resilience is 
carried out through large scale computational simulations of disruption in the Department of 
Homeland Security’s National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center at Los Alamos and at 
the Sandia National Laboratories (Sims, 2010). Resilience has become an algorithmic predictor of 
social vulnerability, embedded in structures that incline towards preemptive intervention.
Resilience and the Anthropocene can be seen as grand narratives of crisis, played out at the level of 
populations and the planet. However, in this reading, they are closely correlated with emerging 
effects at the level of lived daily experience; effects which we might call algorithmic governance. I 
have argued that both the Anthropocene and resilience are tied to computation, as the matrix from 
which they emerged and as the means through which they can be thought. The consequences of 
their calculations are calls for anticipatory intervention. This mode of acting, of algorithmically 
driven prediction and preemption, is becoming present in many other areas of our lives. Our actions 
in the world encounteg an ever-increasing number of digital touch points, giving rise to data which 
can be enrolled in computational modelling and decision making. These ripples, which make our 
passage visible to machinic structures, are generated by websites, smartphones, financial systems, 
transport systems and the widening network of the Internet of Things (Mayer-Schonberger & 
Cukier, 2013). The data points recoro our shopping choices, viewing preferences and social 
networks, our friendships, our journeys and our political leanings. These streams of big data are 
drawn through the analytic sieve of datamining and machine learning, and meaning is assigned 
through finding clusters, correlations and anomalies that can be used to make predictions (Ng, 
2016). The original commercial application of datamining was to predict the next set of 
supermarket purchases, but the potential for prediction is becoming prevalent wherever there is the 
notion of a risk which can be computationally calculated. 
Algorithmic prediction drives the domination of high-frequency trading in contemporary stock 
markets (Nestler, 2014). It is also used to make decisions about pay day loans of a few hundred 
pounds (Morozov, 2013), where your correlation with a social network of poor debt repayers makes
you more likely to get the loan on the basis that you can be subjected to a future of punishing 
interest rates. Datamining is present in the workplace and is used in the human resource 
departments of large companies like Wal-Mart and Credit Suisse to predict which employees are 
'flight risks' (Silverman & Waller, 2015). Data analytics are also active on the streets; in some US 
states, police stop and search is targeted by prediction software like PredPol. Like resilience, 
predictive policing is an example of what we might call algorithmic slippage, where in this case 
"the same mathematics that predicts aftershocks from an earthquake is applied to the prediction of 
crime" (PredPol, 2015). According to the company, their software is twice as successful at 
predicting the blocks in which the next petty crimes will take place as human methods. Machine 
learning is starting to find traction in the most intimate and critical areas of social policy, such as the
potential for preventing child abuse. In New Zealand, the government commissioned algorithms to 
predict which families are likely to abuse their children. The proposed solution uses Predictive Risk 
Modelling based on 132 different variables (Vaithianathan, 2012) and, “in the top decile... was 48% 
accurate in terms of prediction of substantiated abuse within the child’s first five years of life” 
(Keddell, 2015). Although the implementation of this algorithm was halted by the ministry because 
of concerns about the way frontline workers would act on the predictions (‘Govt halts abuse 
prediction study’, 2015) there is a growing industry of predictive analytics solutions for child 
welfare (M. S. Brown, 2016).
The potential for anticipatory intervention is also entering everyday life through the arrival of the 
so-called smart city (Hollands, 2008). The smart city consists of pervasive computation in the urban
fabric, which posits continuous adaptation through a cycle of sensing-computation-actuation. 
Heterogeneous data streams from sensors are processed in to a dashboard of metrics that triggers 
automated changes. Although the primary goals of the smart city are expressed in terms of social 
efficiencies such as frictionless journeys to work and to the shopping centre, it has also acquired an 
environmental mission. Consumer smart meters, Nest home thermostats and their industrial 
equivalents are seen as ways to optimise energy use (VanHemert, 2013). Speed limits and traffic 
lights are manipulated to modify car exhaust emissions in near real-time (Bielsa, 2011). Through 
claims to energy efficiency and the reduction of emissions, the smart city is being held up as a boost
to environmental sustainability and a response to climate change. Continuous adaptations are made 
to optimise flows with respect to the higher parameters of smoothness and greenness. As a multi-
dimensional complex system constantly moving between temporary states of equilibrium, enrolling 
data both from individuals and infrastructures, the smart city becomes a climate-friendly 
manifestation of high-frequency resilience and a platform for algorithmic governance.
What, though, are the politics of these interventions? By probing us for proclivities of which we 
may or may not be aware, algorithmic governance seems to offer an apparatus with traction on 
security, public health and energy use. Real-time interventions plot a path where risks are 
preempted. But, as Brian Massumi says, this kind of preemption acts not to inhibit a future event 
from taking place but rather to bring the future into the present as an effect. “Preemption does not 
prevent, it effects. It induces the event, in effect. Rather than acting in the present to avoid an 
occurrence in the future, preemption brings the future into the present.” (Massumi, 2005, p8). 
Algorithmic preemption is effect without a cause. It is action actuated by patterns; the agency of 
pattern finding, probabilistic algorithms that substitute correlation for causation. The juridical basis 
of most societies is that if we are to be judged, we should at least know the grounds. The problem is
not only that algorithmic governance introduces judgement by guesswork, as probabilistic 
algorithms will necessarily produce false positives, but that the nature of machine learning and big 
data mean that the conclusions are not necessarily reversible to human reasoning. The millions of 
pathways summed over, and their processing by matrices of correlation, simply can't be unpicked 
by hand. As a result “data mining might point to individuals and events, indicating elevated risk, 
without telling us why they were selected” (Zarsky, 2013, p1519). The politics of predictive 
algorithms is the unceasing projection of predictive patterns on to forms of life; a calculative 
imaginary that selects allowable forms of emergence. Thus algorithmic governance functions in the 
world as a form of biopolitics.
Biopolitics, Entanglement
Biopolitics, as defined by Foucault, describes the emergence of a new mode of power that is 
concerned not simply with being able to kill opponents  (as in sovereignty) or with disciplining 
populations, but with ensuring that particular forms of life live (Foucault, 2008). Those forms of life
become the focus of that which has to be secured as the political strategy. Biopolitics is therefore a 
form of governance that is hyper-alert to risk, to any threat to the security of valorised forms of life. 
We can see that the Anthropocene, resilience and algorithmic governance can all be seen as forms of
biopolitics in operation. They all mandate anticipatory intervention to ensure the sustainability of 
populations, variously defined. But as Dalby highlights in his discussion of biopolitics and climate 
change, allowing and empowering certain forms of life to live goes hand in hand with allowing 
others to die (Dalby, 2013). Inclusion in the envelope of securitised well-being implies exclusion 
and exception. At the level of daily life, algorithmic governance is made possible by machinic 
processes that embed a tendency to escape due process and thus to create fluctuating states of 
exception, in the sense defined by Giorgio Agamben (McQuillan, 2015). And climate change is 
predicted to bring the risk of climate refugees, populations external to the protected object of 
biopolitics which threaten it and are therefore subject to sanctions such as exclusion, detention, and 
military intervention. It is in the borderlands of biopolitics that we see Foucault's point made clear, 
that " ...we need to see things not in terms of the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a 
disciplinary society and the subsequent replacement of a disciplinary society by a society of 
government; in reality one has a triangle, sovereignty–discipline-government, which has as its 
primary target population as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security" (Foucault, 2008). 
So computationial constructs which call for anticipatory intervention, forms of biopolitics that 
become thinkable through computation, are entangled with the exclusion of the Other. 
Contemporary forms of life which are disallowed, which are allowed to die rather than allowed to 
live, can be defined as those outside the algorithms. 
How can computational constructs acquire sufficient authority to play this lead role in biopolitical 
regimes? I argue that this is based on the entanglement of computation and science. In the culture of
the modern, empirical science is unchallenged as the most authoritative form of truth. Science is 
still regarded as a machine for the production of these truths, through measurement, experiment and
the testing of hypotheses, and the body of scientific knowledge is seen as increasing over time so 
that it asymptotically approaches a full understanding of the real. In order to unpick the way this has
become inseparable from computing, we need to look at the level of data and calculation. Science as
always been based on data, in the form of its observations and experimental measurements, and this 
data is manipulated mathematically to form and test hypotheses. Scientific laws are expressed as 
mathematical statements operating on the data, where measurable aspects of the material world are 
seen to obey reproducible regularities. So it is easy to see how computation became central to 
science, after the emergence of electronic computers post-World War II made the mathematical 
manipulation of data possible at speeds and scales that were previously unattainable. 
But, critically, computing not only extended science through the analysis of experimental results but
by providing the facility to model physical systems. The canonical form of scientific investigation is
to test a hypothesis by controlled experiment where construction of experimental conditions 
attempts to eliminate variation in important variables other than the one being studied. Running the 
experiment repeatedly allows a deductive reasoning, expressed mathematically, about the 
relationship between the varying quantity and the result. Modelling is a way of simulating physical 
experiment by running computational procedures based on a combination of known physical laws 
and accompanying parameterisations. The production of plausible behaviour or results from a 
model are an indication that the assumptions made in its construction, such as the parameters, are 
justifiable or valid. Computational modelling was first used during the Manhattan Project where 
Monte Carlo algorithms were used to model nuclear detonations (Metropolis, 1987). Fast forward to
today, and the scale and power of contemporary computing resources means that modelling can be 
used as a way to investigate pretty much any extremely complex system. Creating a model of a 
system gives the investigator the power to run it under any set of initial conditions and any number 
of times. In 2012 the European Commission gave a grant of one billion Euros to the Human Brain 
Project to simulate the brain in a supercomputing cluster (Griggs, 2013). Rather than the traditional 
scientific approach of reductionism, investigating the increasingly more fundamental layers of a 
problem to unveil the basic physical laws, this approach is synthetic; taking an understanding of 
individual neuron activity and use clusters of processors to approach the scale of brain activity. 
When considering the nature of resilience in relation to biopolitics, for example, we should account 
for the that part of the relationship that comes from the science and computation of complexity. In 
this was we can see how "the coupling of a novel account of nature produced by the complexity 
turn within the disciplines of ecology and economics with ‘environmental’ techniques of 
government constituted a novel apparatus of power/ knowledge" (Zebrowski, 2013). In the case of 
climate change, the science would be impossible without modelling. It is impossible to run physical 
experiments with parallel planets where carbon dioxide levels are different. It is also not possible to 
separate out one variable, as all of the factors that affect climate are strongly interacting and 
interdependent. Therefore modelling the Earth's climate is seen as the only way to answer vital 
questions about the future habitability of the plant. However this introduces its own set of 
complexities. Models rely on data, but there is a disjunct between available climate observations 
and the needs of the model. The modelled systems require regularly gridded data points encircling 
the planet, but actual observations are relatively sparse and very unevenly distributed. They need to 
be interpolated to correspond to the model data (Edwards, 2013, p. 272). Historical and even 
contemporary measurements of actual climatological data varies in form and quality and has to be 
extensively manipulated to fit the needs of a global long-term model. Even with modern 
supercomputing resources there is a limit to the scale at which the climate can be modelled to make 
it computationally tractable, in other words able to be run in a reasonable amount of time. This 
means working with grids of between tens and hundreds of kilometres, not modelling down to the 
level of individual molecules. Therefore so called sub-grid processes, that is physical processes 
operating at finer resolution, have to be parameterised. While choosing suitable parameters has 
some constraints in terms of the known physics and the plausible outcomes, it is very 
underdetermined and, as is typical in computer modelling, the choice of parameters has aspects of a 
craft as much as a science. Models are fundamentally not experiments, which is why even the 
Climate Change panel withdrew from calling their results 'valid' or 'verified' (Edwards, 2013, p. 
349). At best they are probabilistic indicators which can acquire a level of trust, for example by 
roughly agreeing with the predictions of other, independent models.
Such an understanding will also give us traction on the more slippery concepts like resilience and 
algorithmic governance that are spawned by science-computation but have a political half-life far 
beyond their boundaries. The resilience of resilience is an object of inquiry by scholars, who seek to
understand its adaptive spread as a key term in contemporary discourse. In his paper 'What kind of 
thing is resilience?' Anderson considers the fact that resilience, whatever it is, is everywhere. It has 
proliferated across many areas and is described in many ways; as "‘ethos’, ‘programme’, 
‘ideology’, ‘concept’, ‘term’, ‘governing rationality’, ‘doctrine’, ‘discourse’, ‘epistemic field’, 
‘logic’, ‘buzzword’, ‘normative or ideal concept’, ‘strategy of power’ and so on". Anderson's 
assertion is that taking this diversity seriously prevents a premature simplification; an erasure of 
difference that produces a single target for critique, especially the 'consoling' story that resilience is 
fig leaf for neoliberalism. It may therefore be the case that more empirical work is needed to grasp 
the generality and specificity of these 'resiliences' that never appear in a pure form, and absorb 
varying amounts of their precursors (preparedness, risk-based logics). But the argument of this 
paper is not that resilience is a single concept; rather, that this very diversity can be connected to the
contribution of science-computation. The computational construction of Holling's resilience creates 
an object with the hardness of scientific authority. Dropping this in to the complex waters of the 
social creates ripples that are still spreading outwards. The hubris of constructing a highly reactive 
political concept under the banner of objectivity is typical of the science-computation matrix, and a 
similar proliferation across domains of life is happening with 'algorithms' and 'big data'. In this way,
the proliferation of resiliences is a case study for the multiplication that politically active ideas can 
gain from having scientific and computational backing.
The fact that so much modern science is based on complex computer modelling has raised concerns.
Critics of this general approach feel it is diverting from actual science because of the choice to scale
a model, like the Human Brain project, rather than to form a testable hypothesis. They point out that
modelling is not only a potential dilution of science but an introduction of a new set of 
complexities, the computational. Where the success of science during the Enlightenment was to 
discover a relatively simple set of physical laws that successfully predicted nature's patterns, the 
vast computing resources we now use have their own emergent complexity. "For few hundred years 
science was about taking things apart and understanding them, technology was about putting stuff 
together to do things that we wanted. Now the stuff we are putting together is so complex there's a 
new science, of understanding the complex behaviour of our devices" (Mirsky, 2012). In science 
itself the status of modelling is still a topic of lively debate. But without waiting for that debate to 
be resolved, and without the counterweight of the scientific community, the use of predictive 
modelling is spreading like a forest fire through social life, feeding on the dry tinder of big data. At 
least in the case of climate models there are well-founded rules for constraining the outcomes 
through the internal consistency of the physics and the peer review of the International Panel on 
Climate Change. But, as we have seen, social modelling is not subject to the same restraints. 
Resilience models are derived by migrating a systems analysis sideways from its ecological origins 
and away from the restraints of empirical science, while in the emerging field of algorithmic 
governance the tether to causality has been severed completely. Computation as an instrument 
floods Enlightenment habits with so much data that it shifts the balance away from hypotheses and 
introduces it's own opacities in to the heart of the process. But rather than finding a way back out of 
this maze by claiming a means to sever pure science from computation, I will argue for an 
understanding of the politics of science-computation as a basis for adopting a different approach to 
both. An understanding of the politics of their action in the world as science-computation can be 
gained by looking at pre-existing critiques of science itself. 
Thomas Kuhn's publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962 made several 
influential claims about the naive view of scientific progress, arguing that instead of linear progress 
scientific fields undergo periodic 'paradigm shifts' which allow new modes of understanding which 
would have been considered invalid before (Kuhn, 1996). New and old paradigms are 
incommensurable; that is, embedded in conceptual frameworks so dissimilar that they don't allow 
the direct comparison of empirical evidence to favour one over the other. Received beliefs form an 
interdependent network, and theories are underdetermined by the evidence so there are multiple 
hypotheses that could explain a given state of reality. Thus the idea of scientific truth can never be 
established solely by objective criteria but depends on the consensus of a scientific community. This
means the notion of what is science at any time must be influenced by social factors as it is formed 
within the world view of the participating researchers. In N. Katherine Hayle's formulation, we have
a form of 'constrained constructivism' where 'many scientific theories can be consistent with 
nature's order but no one can be uniquely congruent with it' (Hayles, 2001). This modulation of 
science by dominant cultural assumptions is particularly visible to those who may have been 
excluded by them, so it is no surprise that there are substantial critiques of science from both 
feminist and post-colonial positions. These critiques are not saying that science is making things up,
but that science is co-constructed by the natural and the social and changes with the historical social
order. They are a direct challenge to the internalist epistemology of science that assumes science 
can produce a mirror-like reflection of a reality that is already out there and available for reflecting 
(Harding, 1998).
In the context of computational science, assumptions about mirroring reality not only obfuscate any 
critique of cultural factors in science but also blind us to the additional layer of constructed 
assumptions that enter at the stage of computational modelling. All forms of science-computation, 
whether climate modelling, resilience or algorithmic governance, draw authority from their 
association with objectivity, the core scientific assumption that there is a separation of reporting 
from the observer themselves, from their feelings, viewpoints or experiences. While this assumption
has been pragmatically powerful for science, the rigorous division of thinking and feeling has, as 
Levins and Lewontin point out, promoted a moral detachment in scientists which, amplified by 
institutionalisation, has allowed scientists to work on projects which are dangerous and harmful 
without 'indifference to the human consequences' (Levins & Lewontin, 2009). This carries over in 
to computing and computing science, especially as they are focused on the 'how' rather than the 
'why', and merges with them in the current wave of science and computation entanglements which 
starting to have a substantial impact in the world. The idea that the output is objective, because the 
aspect of life it is applied to has been modelled by some combination of mathematical and scientific
ideas and implemented via computing, becomes potentially dangerous both at the policy level and 
at the level of specific instantiations, where the operator charged with acting on the predictions is 
likely to carry no epistemological doubts. 
Capture-based Colonialism
I want to be clear about what is at stake; about what kind of politics is emerging from the 
transversal forms of science-computation that I have described. We can parameterise this politics by
drawing further on the post-colonial critiques of science. The post-colonial view is particularly alert
to the way that, operationally, science has been implicated in colonialism. The direction of 
development of European science was strongly influenced by the needs of the European expansion 
and, historically, research topics were often funded not because they were intellectually interesting 
as such but to solve colonialism's everyday problems, whether of navigation, disease or weaponry 
(McClellan & Regourd, 2000). The political risk in the entanglement of science and computation is 
that it will amplify this recessive gene of colonialism. Warning signs can be seen in the policy level 
discussions which overlay the computational models, one example of which is climate change. 
Some indigenous communities and African countries are dissenting voices at the Conference of the 
Parties  (COP) talks on climate change. They are the most vulnerable and will be the first to bear the
brunt. Yet they have had little role in bringing about increased levels of CO2, which is the side-
effect of industrialisation, nor do they have the most influential positions at the talks, which are 
dominated by those same economic powerhouse nations who are responsible for the problem in the 
first place. When Sudanese diplomat Lumumba Di-Aping, who was the chief negotiator for the G77
group of developing nations at the United Nations Climate Change Conference 2009  (COP15), 
called a meeting of African delegates to say that "we have been asked to sign a suicide pact" 
(Whiteman, 2009) by agreeing to accept a two degree rise of global temperatures above pre-
industrial levels he was broadly dismissed, even though desertification is already fueling war and 
famine in parts of Africa. Certainty about global warming, and therefore the grounding of the 
Anthropocene, is based on Global Circulation Models of climate that calculate a single average 
temperature rise as the key climatological variable. As Adrian Lahoud points out, the consideration 
of global warming through a single global figure rather than local ones is both a technical and a 
political decision(Forensic Architecture, 2014). The uncertainty in predicting regional and local 
temperature rises would be technically more challenging, with greater uncertainties, but the single 
figure masks the above mentioned politics of varying impact. By accident or design, modelling can 
reinforce existing inequalities of power. In the case of algorithmic governance, it opens up whole 
new territories of colonialism. 
 
The first act of colonialism is to capture territory with the objective of extracting value and exerting 
control. The emergence of algorithmic control as capture was predicted by Phillip Agre when he 
wrote his 1994 paper on the 'capture model' (Agre, 1994). His observations were based on the 
introduction of computation into factories and corporate offices but they are even more applicable 
to the era of big data. The capture model suggests that tracking data can lead to the reorganisation of
work and daily life. Studying the stages by which computational logic was introduced in to 
organisations, Agre described the steps as analysis, articulation, imposition, instrumentation and 
elaboration. Existing activities are analysed and re-expressed as a grammar of ways in which they 
can be machinically strung together. The overall model is then imposed and people are required to  
(re)organise their work so it is parseable in the new grammar. This is instrumented by software that 
records the activity and other software that analyses it. In the capture model, the captured activity 
becomes a computational representation of the world.  Crucially, while the capture model claims to 
represent the activities, it actually involves a modulation of those activities to fit with the model and
to align with the preferences of those imposing the model. As Agre says, it is "crucial to appreciate 
the senses in which the imposition and instrumentation phases constitute a reorganization of the 
existing activity, as opposed to simply a representation of it". Through algorithmic governance the 
capture model is extended to new areas of life including the social and, through wearables and 
implantables, the body. The captured data becomes part of the agile modelling of life through 
machine learning and smart systems, with the object of extracting value and exerting control.
Data capture is, in a real sense, the capture of territory. As in historical colonialism, the effect of 
capture is to shift the locus of control and decision making. No sooner has a new zone of life 
become metricated through technical systems than decision making with that data is shifted to the 
colonial metropolis of the cloud. Another key marker of colonialism is Othering; the process of 
rendering persons or groups as 'other' and therefore able to be justifiably exploited. This is what 
data does, in the context of datamining. The datafication of subjects, whether considered as 
individuals or, to use Deleuze's term, as data 'dividuals' (Deleuze, 1992) that are reassembled in 
different ways, is the algorithmic equivalent of Othering. The experiences which follow do not flow
from a recognition of the subject as a person, of any order, but as a flexible assemblage of data 
points that flow through the algorithms. We can see some recognition of this emerging order in 
critiques of Uber's algorithmic management (Rosenblat & Stark, 2015), as drivers experience new 
forms of force at work and employment starts to include jobs that are “below the algorithm” (Kobie,
2016). 
Resilience thinking is the subjectivity of those captured by a complexity that can only be expressed 
computationally. This thinking arises from the application of resilience to the psychological as well 
as the ecological, where virtue is in coping and adaptation to the inescapable fact of complex 
change. Some entities, like the UNDP [url], adopt resilience thinking as empowering because it has 
a focus on a positive potential of dealing with change rather than treating populations as incapable 
victims. But while resilience thinking is "geared towards unblocking and sustaining adaptive 
capacities of individuals and systems" (Schmidt, 2013, p177) its correlate is defusing the concept of
other kinds of human agency. The complex system is a relational socio-ecology and “the vast 
number of system interrelationships lead to unpredictable patterns” have “a dynamic of their own 
that is [only] partly open to explicit human direction” (Baser & Morgan 2008, p16). The distributed 
agency of an irreducible reality exceeds human apprehension and overflows the idea of an 
autonomous human subject who could attempt to change it. The new grounds truths are those 
produced by computational machinery, while "what makes us human and what constitutes the 
specifically human agency, from a resilience perspective, are not autonomy and the transformation 
of the external world but the fact that we have an inner life which equips us exceptionally well with 
adaptive capacities, such as attitude adjustment and expectation management" (Schmidt, 2013, 
p198). In this light, resilience thinking updates the mentality that Fanon critiques in Black Skin, 
White Masks (Fanon, 2008); it is the colonised mentality of algorithmic capture. 
Algorithmic colonialism is the settlement and control of areas of data life by a corporate and 
government entities. Thus, a colonial politics of computational anticipation can arise from the 
'neutral' superposition of science and computation, that is to say, the entanglement of science and 
computation that doesn't raise any questions about accompanying problems of cultural perspective. 
Given the nature of the processes involved, could things be otherwise? What challenges can we 
raise to an undesirable unfolding of consequences through science-computation? The social cost of 
computation as such is usually challenged through a discourse of rights, that is, on the basis of 
privacy and surveillance or transparency and accountability. As I have already indicated, the 
historical challenges to science are more epistemological, especially those from feminist and post-
colonial movements. I suggest we extend these epistemic challenges, under the banner of standpoint
theory, to address the problematic entanglement of computation and science. This can be mobilised 
in a practical way to precipitate a post-colonial politics of science-computation.
Post-colonial computing
The current application of science-computation to provide a grounding for culture, that is, for 
shared beliefs and practices, is exhibiting snow blindness. Dazzled by the power of abstracting the 
world and manipulating it algorithmically, driven by the intoxicating availability of more and more 
data, there is no stopping to ask who's reality it is that is being produced. As with science before it, 
these are seen as questions for other people to answer. The brave new world of Data Science resists 
the claim that it is anything other than a neutral computational craft which, like the mathematical 
language of science, can reveal unseen orderings in our messy reality. We are only starting to 
become aware of the friction that will be generated by these truth claims, as when police in Chicago
defend their predictive heat list of 'future shooters' against accusations of racism by referring to its 
algorithmic basis (Gorner, 2013). This is where standpoint theory becomes important. It highlights 
the fact that value-neutrality is not value neutral, that abstractness and formality express distinctive 
cultural features not the absence of all culture. From a post-colonial point of view, claims for 
modern science as universal and objective are "a politics of disvaluing local concerns and 
knowledge, and legitimating outside experts" (Bandyopadhyay & Shiva, 1988). The science-
computation matrix is subject to the same post-Kuhnian assessment that the success or persistence 
of certain practices cannot be justified as a purely internal truth, but should acknowledge that the 
epistemic status of sciences and technologies are always socially negotiated.
Feminist and post-colonial critiques of science provide leverage on the entanglement of science and 
computation by offering a more nuanced approach to the idea of objectivity. Rather than making 
assumptions about a single universal objectivity, they recognise that the current scientific method is 
good at removing individual bias or problematic experimental results, but is unable to identify 
culture-wide assumptions that shape the selection of particular aspects of reality as significant and 
therefore particular theoretical models as 'truth'. This critique is known as standpoint epistemology, 
or standpoint theory (Harding, 1992). It is concerned with the way that assumptions, discursive 
frameworks and conceptual schemes generated by certain ways of life shape the way dominant 
groups think about both the natural world and about social relations, and the way those assumptions
get baked in to the way everyone else gets to understand the world. As a response, standpoint theory
follows Donna Haraway's call for a position that takes embodied responsibility, against the 
presentation of an objective and neutral view which is by it's own definition above, outside of, 
unlocated, and therefore can't be held to account (Haraway, 1988). Haraway argues for situated and 
embodied knowledges as the grounding for rational knowledge claims, and against the normal 
scientific 'view from nowhere', which she calls the trick of the God view. Standpoint theory 
suggests that positions of social and political disadvantage can actually become sites of analytical 
advantage because they are alert to the culture-wide assumptions that prevailing ideas of objectivity 
have missed. Identifying those assumptions doesn't have to undermine science, but can bring a 
stronger version of objectivity. Objectivity is strengthened by surrendering a claim to neutrality that 
hides the social history of science itself. I therefore believe that, as a general approach, standpoint 
epistemology is well suited to helping untangle the broader matrix of science and computation 
which is rolling out across society.
We are presented with foreclosures of the future across all scales; from grand narratives about the 
planet to Google's Prediction API (Google, 2015). The skeleton key to unlocking this forfeiture is 
not to abandon the benefits of computation but to change the kind of authority and objectivity being
sought. This means, as standpoint theory recommends, "starting thought from marginalised lives" 
(Hirsh, Olson, & Harding, 1995, p193), whatever marginalised may mean in a given context. We 
need to ask in what ways our wonderful infrastructures of computation and collaboration can be re-
grounded in the lives they affect, rather than concealing their hegemonic tendencies by material and
metaphorical distancing. Whether the computing of cloud circulation or the misleading idea of 
cloud computing, the mechanisms of computational anticipation need to be brought back to 
something that enables a democratised affect and agency. To get a glimpse of what this might mean 
in practice we can again draw a parallel with science, by examining the emerging field of citizen 
science. 
The term citizen science marks out a contested territory. Some claiming the name are simply 
collecting data for experiments designed by scientists or participating in online crowdsourcing to 
scale scientific pattern recognition. In other projects, participants are involved in every step of the 
process, from framing research questions to collecting data to interpreting results and deciding on 
actions. These projects can be seen as applications of critical pedagogy to the practice of 
community science. That is, following Paulo Freire, the collective investigation of their conditions 
and the exploration of methods for changing them  (Freire, 2000). These empirical projects are 
attentive to Donna Haraway's point about prosthetics; that we are already cyborgs in relation to our 
ways of knowing the world. It is in the intricacies of these visualization technologies in which we 
are embedded that we will find metaphors and means for understanding and intervening in the 
patterns of objectification in the world-that is, the patterns of reality for which we must be 
accountable. In these metaphors, we find means for appreciating simultaneously both the concrete, 
'real' aspect and the aspect of semiosis and production in what we call scientific knowledge 
(Haraway, 1988, p589 ). 
Recognising this embeddedness in technical ways of knowing, the wider question for a citizen 
science project is to ask what form of social recomposition becomes possible; what change in the 
production of knowledge of the physical world can also be, at the same time, a political formation. 
I am suggesting, therefore, that a parallel movement of critical citizen computation is both possible 
and necessary. The invasion of all areas of life by algorithms claiming to know more than we do 
about what we want, or what we will do next, is in full swing. But algorithmic means themselves 
are becoming more accessible to citizens, and in forms that can be deterritorialising as much as 
territorialising (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004). A prototype of this algorithmic differentness is the 
blockchain, the technology behind bitcoin. Transactions can be trusted because of an algorithmic 
mechanism called 'proof of work' which is basically incorruptible because it is implemented through
a cryptographic hashing function. The result are distributed, trustable records that don't require a 
centralised authority. However, the import of the blockchain for citizen computation doesn't rest 
only on the idea of trust. Like machine learning, the blockchain is a mechanism for pattern 
production that maps on to the social, but in different way. For one thing, it is a mechanism of data 
distribution rather than data concentration; rather than sucking in forms of social and scientific big 
data, the blockchain ledger is a permanent record maintained by a vast and distributed network of 
peers. As such, as a transparent and distributed base layer for encoding social rules, the blockchain 
addresses various collective action problems such as the so-called tragedy of the commons. 
Mackenzie writes about the unexplored social potential in the patterns of datamining, asking 
whether the functions that generate the data "might also diagram different forms of association". In 
the same way, algorithmic technologies like the blockchain may enable the rediscovery of forgotten 
non-market patterns.  "Bitcoin is not really about the loss of power of a few governments, but about 
the possibility for many more people to experiment with the building of new constituencies" (Roio, 
2013) 
Looking backwards from the idea of the Anthropocene, we can see that to anticipate sustainability 
for a fragile planet it is necessary to extend science beyond strictly traditional methods. However, 
climate modelling has only extended science along the computation axis. If it had drawn more from 
proposals like Post-Normal Science (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993) it would have built-in the idea of 
reflection by extended stakeholder communities including, first and foremost, those directly 
affected by an issue. Such a model of science-computation would act as a restraint for its more feral
cousins, resilience and algorithmic governance. Rather than accepting algorithms as agents of 
disempowerment, or as recapitulations of older colonial technologies, we can exploit the fact that 
the process of capture is not a closed one. An overlooked aspect of Philip Agre's capture model is 
his emphasis on de-capture, or different articulations. Agre points out that, as form of grammar, any 
capture model can be used to express a huge variety of sequences of meaning, including the 
concrete possibility for expressing alternatives. Within every assemblage is a latent general 
assembly, in the sense of the Occupy movement, and in the case of science-computation 
assemblages this democratic dimension is in urgent need of discovery. 
Conclusions
This paper has attempted to perform a stratigraphy of computational culture; not to claim a new 
epoch or even era of algorithmic governance, but to highlight a boundary layer of over-reliance on 
calculative anticipation.  Computational prediction is a powerful tool, but it produces neither 'truth' 
nor 'good'. Thoughtlessly allowing it to become the grounding for our shared beliefs and practices, 
in other words our culture, is likely to return us to colonial patterns of relations. 
In the General Circulation Models of climate change, virtual global systems are spun up from 
scratch without initial conditions or data until they settle in stable states; these become predictions 
of possible future worlds. They are, in their own way, are a vivid concresence of the techno-
scientific God view. That is not to say that those models are useless, that the climate isn't being 
changed by human intervention, that we don't have the makings of a crisis, or that we shouldn't 
intervene urgently. Rather the opposite. It is to call for a critique focused on the form with which the
truth of change is established and the implications that brings, especially in terms of politics and 
(dis)empowerment. The 'distanced' mode of establishing truth through computation has spread to 
general society without any concomitant effort to develop a praxis, that is to say a reflective practice
with an ethical disposition. The securitised modelling of social resilience to future crises, climate or 
otherwise, becomes active in the present as a driver of biopolitics. The new extractive data 
industries race to colonise every corner of our experience, othering us as datafied subjects, and 
seizing the future through predictive calculations and preemptive interventions. Abstraction has 
erased political agency. 
This praxis will come through a subjectivity whose standpoint is a co-presence with the world. 
Faced with the idea of the Anthropocene there is "the possibility of infusing resilience narratives 
with intersubjectivity" (Powell, Larsen, & Bommel, 2014, p135 ), that is, a subjectivity that goes 
beyond a conception of humans contending with nature to a see ourselves simply as one species of 
persons in a pervasive field of reciprocating persons.  The idea of intersubjective resilience 
proposes that "beyond the scientific realm, and within local contexts, there are a plethora of 
legitimate perspectives on global environmental change processes held by stakeholders. Rather than
relying on reified scientific narratives, research should work to empower these perspectives and 
practices" (ibid.). However powerful our computational tools become, and however complex the 
narratives they underpin, they are not necessary for the sense of responsibility and accountability 
called forth by standpoint epistemology. We don't need computational prediction to know when life 
is out of balance. In 1977, at a time when computational climate modelling was still taking its first 
stumbling steps, a statement from the Haudenosaqunee (Iroquois) nation was delivered to the first 
United Nations Conference on Indigenous People in Geneva. Drafted by John Mohawk and 
approved by their Grand Council of Chiefs (Curl, n.d.) the 'Basic Call to Consciousness' articulates 
a world view that combines shared agency with deep responsibility. "The air is foul, the waters 
poisoned, the trees dying, the animals are disappearing. We think even the systems of weather are 
changing. Our ancient teaching warned us that if Man interfered with the Natural Laws, these things
would come to be. When the last of the Natural Way of Life is gone, all hope for human survival 
will be gone with it" A Basic Call to Consciousness, 1978 (as cited in Mander, 1991, p191)
Standpoint epistemology offers an alternative to computational colonialism. “A standpoint is not the
same as a viewpoint or a perspective, for it requires both science and a political struggle” (Harding, 
1998, p. 150). We need not just to critique entanglements of science and computation but to re-work
them in to a post-colonial politics of both algorithms and atmospheres. Different approaches to 
science have shown us a way to intervene in the wider patterns of objectification in the world 
because “only partial perspective promises objective vision” (Haraway, 1988, p583), and this 
commitment to the messy ambiguities of the analogue signals the return of politics over algorithms 
and the subsumption of calculative prediction to the imaginative vision of social movements. 
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